UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

United	States of America,	Case No. 3:25-MJ-70778
	Plaintiff, v.	) STIPULATED ORDER EXCLUDING TIME ) UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
JEFFER	SON ARRECHAGA	) AND WAIVER UNDER FRCP 5.1
	Defendant(s).	)
For the reasons stated by the parties on the record on \( \frac{7\lambda 5}{\lambda 5} \), the court excludes time under the Speedy Trial Act from \( \frac{7\lambda 5/\lambda 5}{\lambda 6} \) to \( \frac{8\lambda 5}{\lambda 25} \) and finds that the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C. \( \frac{8}{\lambda 161(h)(7)(A)} \). The court makes this finding and bases this continuance on the following factor(s):		
	Failure to grant a continuance wou See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i).	ald be likely to result in a miscarriage of justice.
	defendants, the nature of the or law, that it is unreasonable to ex	lex, due to [check applicable reasons] the number of e prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact spect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or the trial shed by this section. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii).
	Failure to grant a continuance wou taking into account the exercise of	ald deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).
	Failure to grant a continuance wou counsel's other scheduled case con See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv)	ald unreasonably deny the defendant continuity of counsel, given mmitments, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
*	Failure to grant a continuance would necessary for effective preparation See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv)	ald unreasonably deny the defendant the reasonable time a, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
$\nearrow$	With the consent of the defendant, and taking into account the public interest in the prompt disposition of criminal cases, the court sets the preliminary hearing to the date set forth in the first paragraph and — based on the parties' showing of good cause — finds good cause for extending the time limits for a preliminary hearing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1 and for extending the 30-day time period for an indictment under the Speedy Trial Act (based on the exclusions set forth above). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1; 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b).	
IT IS	SO ORDERED.	
DATE	D: 7/25/25	Les Holy
		United States Magistrate Judge
STIPU	JLATED: J. J.	2 Jun Borns
	Attorney for Defendant	Assistant United States Attorney